Coordinated contracting arrangements (CCA) principles

To achieve this principle, the DTA will consider whether the proposed CCA:

• achieves strategically significant investments at scale for the Australian Government
• supports the Australian Government budgeting, by recouping setup, management, and transition costs over the CCA’s lifetime
• meets the procurement need better than other (non-CCA) contracting mechanisms
• maintains competitive neutrality and addresses dependency risks through:
  • proportionate thresholds for different categories and commercial models — promoting competition, reducing market concentration risks and balancing demand forecasts (enough entities, enough spend, etc.) without significantly diluting buying power
  • proportionate timeframes — balancing the certainty that CCAs provide (including long-term investments needed to achieve long-term outcomes) with the time limit restrictions applying to non-CCA digital and ICT contracts..

What good looks like, in practice

• CCAs are more than volume sourcing agreements. They solve real problems by creating the certainty needed to secure outcomes that uplift the Australian Government at scale (which entities cannot achieve alone or through other procurement arrangements).
• CCAs deliver cost avoidances and contracting efficiencies to Australian Government buyers.
• CCAs are proportionate to specific objectives and do not distort market competition for others.
• Buyers leverage CCAs as a contracting mechanism after approaching the market, ensuring a competitive value-for-money assessment takes place.

To achieve this principle, the DTA will consider whether the proposed CCA:

• operates within Australian Government governance settings, with the seller accepting the Australian Government’s requirements and protections
• specifies which Australian Government terms and conditions take precedence over the default terms and conditions of the seller (including resellers, subcontractors, partner networks, etc.)
• can be applied consistently by the seller (including resellers, subcontractors, partner networks, etc.).
   

What good looks like, in practice

• Sellers (including resellers, subcontractors, partner networks, etc.) understand and respond to the Australian Government’s unique requirements – for example, equivalent to expectations of seller alignment to the specific DTA marketplace or panel terms and conditions – recognising the Australian Government buyer profile is not interchangeable with commercial customers.
• Buyers and sellers engage with risk where it matters:
  • The CCA mitigates sellers needing to price in unnecessary risk by ensuring reasonable changes to Australian Government requirements can be managed in a clear and transparent way over the life of the CCA. 
  • The CCA protects buyers from the risk of the seller failing to comply with core requirements (legislative, instruments, policy, frameworks, standards, etc.) by clearly identifying which obligations are separate from matters that may be negotiated commercially.

To achieve this principle, the DTA will consider whether the proposed CCA:

• aggregates the CCA’s anticipated value, streamlining planning and implementation for procurement connected policies (PCPs) and ensuring anticipated contracting volume is not divided into separate parts that individually fall below PCP thresholds
• actively adopts the ‘Australian business’ and ‘Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)’ definitions from the Commonwealth Procurement Rules, including during planning and implementation for PCPs
• supports the Australian Government workforce, in alignment with the APS Data, Digital and Cyber Workforce Plan 2025–30
• enables transparent and auditable measurement and reporting of broader economic benefit outcomes
• plans and delivers broader economic benefits for Australians, including local skills, innovation and industry participation opportunities, proportionate to the scale and nature of the arrangement; and potentially also:
  • investment in Australian infrastructure and/or technology capability
  • contribution to environmental sustainability
  • research and development activities conducted in Australia, with ownership (such as intellectual property) remaining in Australia
  • contribution to social initiatives in Australia, for example, employing or contracting with businesses that primarily employ marginalised workers
  • other direct benefits to Australian society and/or the Australian economy.
     

What good looks like, in practice:

• The Australian technology sector has opportunities to expand locally and/or within global supply chains.
• Sellers’ planning and implementation of PCPs, using aggregated contracting volumes, is effective and auditable.
• The Australian Government workforce develops enduring capability and skills, both formal (accredited) and informal, that remain after the CCA has concluded.
• Public reporting of sellers’ achievements against standardised broader economic benefits performance measures are commensurate with the scale of each CCA, and auditable.

To achieve this principle, the DTA will consider whether the proposed CCA:

• presents risk if the seller, including any parent company, may be subject to laws, regulatory directions or other arrangements which could create risks that override or circumvent Australian contractual protections
• includes assurances on the seller’s ability to demonstrate transparency regarding jurisdictional control, operational control and decision-making authority
• contributes to the development of Australian sovereign capability, including local skills, expertise, intellectual property, supply chains or infrastructure
• strengthens Australia’s resilience by reducing dependency risks and supporting continuity of government operations during disruption
• identifies sovereignty and resilience outcomes that can be measured, monitored and reported throughout the life of the CCA.

What good looks like, in practice:

• Information and infrastructure are located in Australia, subject to our legislation and regulations.
• Information is not shared outside of Australia without our Australian Government’s agreement.
• Australian encryption prevents access from a foreign jurisdiction (for example, if a seller or parent company is compelled by authorities beyond the Australian border).
• Sellers notify our Australian Government immediately if information is accessed overseas, including the circumstances of how the information was accessed, and close gaps after incidents.
• Sellers provide meaningful business continuity and redress if goods and services are not delivered due to foreign activities (the Australian Government in Australia, rather than the seller, decides what is essential to the delivery of government services).
• Capabilities are developed and embedded over the long term within the Australian Government Architecture.

Additional context:

Accountable authorities have a duty to establish and maintain systems relating to risk and control. Furthermore, paragraph 2.6 of the Commonwealth Procurement Rules, released in 2025, states the rules do not apply to the extent that an accountable authority (or an official to whom an accountable authority delegates the power to determine such measures) applies measures necessary for the protection of essential security interests.

Some countries have adopted extraterritorial legislation compelling sellers subject to their jurisdiction, including parent companies, to take actions leaving buyers in other jurisdictions without redress. Australia is not immune from these risks. If a seller, including parent company, is compelled by an extraterritorial jurisdiction:

• access to products and services, which our Australian Government relies on, could be removed
• data stored in Australia could be accessed and decrypted outside the border.

Building our digital and ICT sovereignty, resilience and use of technology is more than a contractual, geographical, jurisdictional, business continuity, or technical (for example, encryption-related) construct. If determined necessary for the protection of essential security interests, it may be necessary to embed such capabilities, over the long term, within the Australian Government Architecture.
 

To achieve this principle, the DTA will consider whether the proposed CCA:

• provides flexibility for buyers to integrate the seller’s offering with their own architectures, rather than requiring buyers to adopt the seller’s operating model
• has technology that is used, or is expected to be used, across the Australian Government
• is interoperable with existing and emerging Australian Government technology ecosystems
• allows easy portability of data, workloads and services, and has technology capable of supporting Australian Government outcomes without unreasonable dependency risks
• includes transparent and practical transition arrangements that can be implemented at the conclusion of the CCA and/or exit planning, including data extraction and service continuity arrangements.
   

What good looks like, in practice

• Buyers use the technology as a tool to support, not become, their internal processes.
• The technology is suitable for Australian Government buyers across various sectors and does not need unnecessary customisation for individual needs.
• Prior to the conclusion of the CCA, buyers develop and are prepared to implement transition plans (to move out of the technology), pending advice from the DTA in relation to potential extensions of an existing CCA, intention to negotiate a new CCA.

To achieve this principle, the DTA will consider whether the proposed CCA:

• has a commercial model that is likely to be workable and deliver value across a diverse range of Australian Government buyers
• includes seller flexibility for different buyer sizes, sectors, jurisdictions and procurement needs
• includes commercial structures that accommodate different usage of technology, including delivery, pricing models, and portability between buyers
• includes pricing arrangements that are transparent and proportionate to expected demand
• includes change mechanisms to incorporate future changes without creating unreasonable commercial uncertainty
• includes sufficient competitive tension and periodic reviews to maintain value over the life of the arrangement
• demonstrates whole-of-life value for money, including implementation, transition, support and exit costs.

What good looks like, in practice

• Buyers of all sizes have access to the same price and commercial terms.
• Periodic reviews demonstrate the CCA is accessible to buyers across the whole of government – reflecting different sectors, sizes, and risk profiles (and preferably, different jurisdictions and budget cycles).