4.29 It is beneficial to have a central authority, such as the DTA, stewarding and fostering effective relationships with the major technology sellers – supported by a clear mandate, legislative frameworks and financial control.
4.30 Shared Services Canada (SSC) and New Zealand’s Government Chief Digital Officer (GCDO) demonstrate that centralised leadership ensures the coordination and governance required to streamline procurement and enhance service delivery. Such structures empower agencies to implement cohesive and standardised approaches across technology initiatives.
4.31 Central control maximises negotiating power, enabling governments to secure more favourable terms. By consolidating purchasing power, central authorities can leverage scale to secure improved pricing and deliver value-for-money outcomes for agencies, an approach that particularly benefits those with smaller resource profiles.
4.32 Further, the New Zealand GCDO is considering the implementation of a budget prioritisation mechanism for digital investments, similar to the model the DTA has with the Investment Oversight Framework and the Digital Investment Plans.
4.33 The SSC’s Centre of Expertise in Agile and Innovative Procurement was also established in 2019. It focuses on supporting government procurement teams and removing barriers to entry for smaller business with respect to complex government tender processes.
4.34 At approximately the same time, in Australia in March 2019, Finance established the Commonwealth’s Centre of Procurement Excellence (CoPE). CoPE provides advice, training and support the broad procurement capability uplift across the Commonwealth, however, it does not specialise in technology. It is important to note there are substantial complexities in the procurement of technology platforms, with specialist knowledge of the technological solutions often required to support procurement activities. Further, through engagement activities, this review is aware of several specialist technology procurement functions which exist in pockets throughout the Commonwealth (e.g. PM&C, DEWR, Defence), and that could be complemented by a model similar to that of Canada. In other words, Australia could benefit from having a DTA-led technology procurement specialist capability.
4.35 Further to the above, when comparing to arrangements the SSA sellers have with other government agencies globally, the value of central coordination by the DTA was also echoed by several of the SSA sellers.
4.36 Other nations and Australian States and Territories interviewed all shared similar views about the importance of ensuring whole of government arrangements remain fit-for-purpose by tailoring and driving flexibility to address diverse agency needs and risk profiles, and adapt to technological changes over time.
4.37 Canada’s experience in respect of managing the diverse risks and priorities which differ significantly between agencies highlights the importance of enabling flexibility and tailoring. Shared Services Canada needs to accommodate variations across 213 agencies, from Mountain Rangers in remote regions to administrative specialists in urban locations, to ensure the effectiveness of their centralised agreements. This diverseness can be likened to Australia’s, with technology needing to be able to cater for Australians and the Australian Government across an equally diverse range.
4.38 Flexibility within centralised arrangements also ensures that whole of government arrangements can adapt to changing operational demands and technological advancements. By integrating mechanisms that reflect the unique challenges and objectives of individual agencies, governments can foster resilience and alignment ensuring continued relevance and efficiency in service delivery.
4.39 Accurate and centralised data collection is fundamental to making informed decisions about technology contracts and investments. Improved transparency through robust reporting processes helps governments identify trends, optimise investments and strengthen negotiations.
4.40 One of the challenges facing the USA is the absence of meaningful aggregated data on technology spending. Current reporting mechanisms rely on self-reported information from personnel who may lack the requisite expertise, limiting the reliability and comprehensiveness of the data collected. To address this, in January 2024 the US Government Accountability Office called for a series of improvements in technology reporting, releasing a report with two primary recommendations across major US agencies, including:
4.41 Action on these recommendations was subsequently implemented.
4.42 Whilst progress on reporting transparency in the USA has been limited, nations like Canada and New Zealand demonstrate the benefits of improved data collection and transparency in enabling informed decision-making and strategic planning across government ICT portfolios. Canada, for example, has achieved notable cost visibility through detailed comparative analyses, metrics and explicit unit cost reductions for services such as connectivity. Challenges were noted by New Zealand in respect of opaque investment visibility, which is partly underpinned by insufficient or inconsistent reporting mechanisms, hampering decision-making around technology investment.
4.43 Whilst there is an administrative overhead introduced through any new reporting requirement, the lesson Australia can draw from other nations is the significant value that can be achieved from better informed decision-making as related to ICT investment and buy.
4.44 There is an ongoing tension between:
4.45 There is no one permanent solution, and all jurisdictions reported needing to constantly consider this balance.
4.46 Maintaining competitive tension wherever practicable is essential to managing the risks of monopolistic supplier arrangements. This is a principle enshrined within the CPRs and is observed throughout procurement activities within the Australian Government.
4.47 Canada and New Zealand’s efforts to avoid over-reliance on single sellers demonstrates the importance of preserving bargaining power and fostering value-for-money outcomes. An example comes from the Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) capability where both nations have sought to engage a diverse range of ERP providers, for example SAP, Workday and TechnologyOne.
4.48 Where other nations find themselves in a position of dependency or with high switching costs, contracts can be moved to negotiating a rolling contractual window basis (e.g. 5 years), negotiating one out-year at a time. Although 5 years is not a significant window to replace entrenched, critical technology, this allows a sufficient approach for the nation to plan and execute a transition from existing technology, if required.
4.49 Other nations noted anecdotally that large technology sellers frequently exploit fragmented procurement landscapes, leveraging the lack of transparency and unified agreements to maintain advantageous commercial positions. As such, fragmented procurement and contracting can increase monopolistic risk.
4.50 Further, other nations noted that the large technology sellers often show little interest in promoting change or enhancing transparency, as the status quo enables them to maximise their influence and profitability.
4.51 To counteract this dynamic, governments must coordinate efforts to negotiate more equitable arrangements. Establishing unified contracts and increasing transparency diminishes fragmentation while fostering a more competitive and fair procurement environment that benefits all stakeholders.
4.52 Whole of government arrangements were commonly cited by other nations as large and complex. As a consequence, it is difficult for the users of these arrangements to stay informed, and to know how to extract full value. This was echoed by the State and Territory users of the SSAs.
4.53 A key mechanism utilised by Canada was the establishment of an online IT Service Catalogue for government agencies to obtain information about, and to order, enterprise services (e.g. email, mobile technology, workplace technology devices). The introduction of this catalogue supported Canadian agencies to better deliver programs and services by making the information about the arrangements more readily available.
4.54 While the Australian Government already has in place BuyICT, the value of this as a mechanism to enable ease of information access was echoed by New Zealand. What is evident in comparing digital.govt.nz and BuyICT.gov.au, the information commonly included is:
4.55 Further, to the extent possible, the preference is for information to not be protected behind a credential wall (i.e. requiring a log in) to make access as simple as possible. A key exception to this is any commercial in-confidence materials (e.g. discount pricing offered by a seller).
While the review considers SSAs remain fit-for-purpose for supporting the Australian Government’s digital transformation agenda, the review identified numerous ways to extract further value by strengthening their design, management and impact.
In terms of engaging with the market, there is opportunity to:
In terms of maximising negotiation outcomes:
Other observations include the need to: set clearer expectations for what constitutes a strategic partnership with the Australian Government to further enhance the national digital agenda; uplift information, education and reporting; and review existing SSAs to ensure they remain fit-for-purpose and strategically aligned.
Chapter 5
5.1 The Australian Government has an opportunity to generate further value from whole of Australian Government arrangements like single seller arrangements (SSAs), by investing in their future.
5.2 Australian Government agencies are reliant on these technologies and will typically engage these sellers regardless of whether SSAs exist. As such, consolidating these needs and arrangements under a single head agreement makes sense, particularly when complemented by a clear framework for selection, management and removal of sellers.
5.3 In the same spirit, while there is broad support to retain SSAs in some form due to the proven benefits to the Australian Government, the review identified numerous ways in which further value can be extracted. For example, implementation of CAIP Plans and raising expectations through the establishment of an SSA seller led Technology Collaboration Centre as outlined in the Enhancing growth of the Australian technology sector section of this report.
5.4 The other most commonly supported strategic opportunities with regards to the market are discussed below.
5.5 While some technology and digital long-term planning processes are in place across the Australian Government (for example, the Data and Digital Government Strategy), better leverage of these for whole of Australian Government strategic sourcing purposes will be useful. Meaningfully understanding the technology choices being made by agencies in their strategic plans is a valuable input to determining what emerging needs are, relevant to SSAs.
5.6 The transition from on-premise technology to cloud services over the past decades has introduced major changes to the technology landscape within the Australian Government, including a pronounced disconnect in digital planning across agencies, making identification and establishment of new SSAs challenging. Traditionally, long-term technology financial planning was embedded within 10-year Capital Management Plans, encompassing extensive planned outlays for upcoming technological investments. However, the transition to cloud services, coupled with the shift from capital expenditure (CAPEX) to operational expenditure (OPEX), has undermined the completeness of these plans. The inherently short-term nature of OPEX spending complicates the projection of long-term financial needs, thereby degrading the strategic foresight embedded within the Capital Management Plans.
5.7 A range of existing information sources is available to the Digital Transformation Agency (DTA) to inform the strategic sourcing priorities relevant to the SSAs, as illustrated in the figure below.
5.20 The IOF typically requires the submission of two key artefacts as part of the two-pass business case process:
5.21 Where sellers or technology choices are specifically identified within the business case, these can be consolidated into the technology architectural landscape for the Australian Government, noting the review acknowledges there are Government security provisions which apply to New Policy Proposals.
5.22 In respect of the SSAs, it is noted that the IOF is primarily focused on New Policy Proposals. While this framework provides robust oversight for investments in technology over $10m, including the sustainment of the solutions typically over the forward estimates (a five-year window), it commonly excludes consideration of expenditure that is essential for maintaining and upgrading existing digital capabilities, or any agency internally funded technology projects.
5.23 The establishment of this planning represents a key data and information gathering opportunity, to identify emerging large-scale product and service requirements, which in turn may support SSA opportunity identification. The Digital Investment Plans can capture:
5.24 As relevant, this can be supplemented by engagement activities to understand technology roadmaps or strategies as relevant to the SSAs.
5.25 Sellers commonly make available their technology plans, including upgrade plans and end of life intentions. These are critical inputs to the long-term planned use of technologies, in particular cloud services.
5.26 The DTA could overlay the actual usage, IOF and DIPs with these seller plans as part of determining key areas of focus for negotiations and determining emerging whole of Australian Government technology risks which could be addressed through the SSA.
5.27 In considering whether the SSAs be retained, the review came from a first principles perspective, weighing the relative strengths and weaknesses available as contracting models.
5.28 A range of models are available to the Australian Government when contracting with technology sellers, which include:
5.29 The strengths and weaknesses impacting each of these models is outlined in the table below.
Strength / Weakness | Description | SSA Contracting Framework (including proposed changes) | Limited Tender SSA model (current model) | Panel model | Individual agency contracts | Model contracts |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Strengths | Maximised leverage for negotiation, especially for mid-size / small agencies | X | X | Larger agencies may be able to compel similar commercial offers | Larger agencies may be able to compel similar commercial offers | Larger agencies may be able to compel similar commercial offers |
Consistent terms and conditions | X | X | X | Nil | X | |
Improved contracting efficiency (relative to individual agency contracting) | X Also, reflective of anticipated buy profile | X Also, reflective of anticipated buy profile | X | Nil | Nil | |
Maximises competitive tension | Expansion of SSAs will encourage greater competition amongst those holding SSAs | Nil | X | X | X | |
Leverage of specialist technology procurement expertise in DTA | X | X | X | Nil | Nil | |
Improved transparency through AusTender reporting | X | Nil | X | X | X | |
Centralised management | X | X | X | Nil | Nil | |
Highly tailored to agency requirements | Nil | Nil | Nil | X | X | |
Weaknesses | Not specifically tailored to agency requirements, necessitating further detail be included within work orders (contracts) | X | X | X | Nil | Nil |
AusTender reporting complexity, limiting transparency | Nil | X | Nil | Nil | Nil | |
Limited specialist technology procurement expertise outside of very large agencies | Nil | Nil | X | X | X | |
The terms and conditions within panels don’t align to those within the SSA | X | X | Nil | Nil | Nil | |
Inconsistency in pricing, and terms and conditions across agencies | Nil | Nil | X | X | X | |
Limited realisation of contracting efficiencies | Nil | Nil | X | X | X |
5.30 Further to the above, and as already noted within this report, the SSAs are complex. Given that both the SSA seller and the Australian Government have to be satisfied with the contract negotiation outcome, there will always be an element of difference between each of the SSAs respectively and any panels in place, reflective of the outcome of the negotiations.
5.31 While the precise structure and format of the head agreement and contracts are to be developed and implemented by the respective legal teams of the DTA and SSA sellers, the following observations were made.
This guidance on Delivery Confidence Assessment (DCA) ratings also references relevant DTA whole-of-government policies throughout to inform assurance providers and other stakeholders of the policies that may be applicable to the investment under review.
The policies considered within this guidance are a selection of DTA-owned policies relevant to the identified focus areas and inputs to a DCA.
The policies referenced are not meant to be an all-encompassing list of digital policies, but rather a select reference of applicable DTA-owned policies for digital and ICT investments.
More information on other digital policies and standards, can be found on Australian Government Architecture.
Purpose, business case and benefits.
OffTo successfully meet this criterion, you need to:
Executive support and governance effectiveness.
OffResource Management and capability. Stakeholder engagement.
OffSchedule. Cost and finance. Scope and change control. Risk management. Commercial management.
OffTechnology. Solution context. Deployment and sustainability.
OffPurpose, business case and benefits.
Executive support and governance effectiveness.
Resource Management and capability. Stakeholder engagement.
Schedule. Cost and finance. Scope and change control. Risk management. Commercial management.
Technology. Solution context. Deployment and sustainability.
The topics and deliverables required to make an assessment can vary. It is recommended that assessors observe the project in action by attending stand-up meetings or board meetings and review live project documentation.
For example, an assessor of an agile project may find it appropriate to assess a project through reference to observing agile artefacts and ceremonies rather than only consuming more traditional project documentation.
The list of example documents that could be assessed during an assurance review to determine the delivery confidence of an investment include:
These include:
Assurance activities are typically a summative assessment at a point in time in a project lifecycle. A DCA is a predictive assessment based on the current state and trajectory of the project.
The topics and deliverables required to make an assessment can vary.
It is recommended that assessors observe the project in action by attending stand-up meetings or board meetings and review live project documentation. For example, an assessor of an agile project may find it appropriate to assess a project through reference to observing agile artefacts and ceremonies rather than only consuming more traditional project documentation.
The list of example documents that could be assessed during an assurance review to determine the delivery confidence of an investment include:
This guidance document provides more detail on the focus areas in the following pages.
Share data: Always begin by reviewing your obligations against privacy policies and the Privacy Act (1988). If external data can be used, make your service interoperable and leverage governments’ open datasets. Support safe, ethical data sharing practices by using the government’s DATA Scheme(Opens in a new tab/window).
Request information once: Assess the data your agency already collects and whether it can be reused to deliver your service. Where it can be reused, eliminate unnecessary data entry requests and fulfil a ‘tell us once’ approach.
Publish open APIs: Thoroughly document your service’s APIs. Where appropriate, open them for other services and third-parties to build upon existing government offerings. Align with the API Design Standard(Opens in a new tab/window) to support cross-jurisdictional data sharing, maintain a consistent, reusable vocabulary and support wider API literacy.
Plan for scale and flexibility: Ensure your service can cater for growth and changing preferences without impacting performance, functionality or stability. Embed adaptability into your design patterns from the outset to allow malleability as future changes may require.
Utilise a Digital ID: Where appropriate, endeavour to integrate the Australia Government Digital ID System, accredited by the Trusted Digital Identity Framework (TDIF)(Opens in a new tab/window), to allow users to access your service with a single set of credentials.
OffIdentifying one or more sellers in the cyber security sector that meet at least some of the indicative criteria is premature for the following key reasons:
For context to this case study, the below provides a non-exhaustive overview of categories that demonstrate how vast the cyber security ecosystem is, noting that each category can be further broken down to specific sub-categories. Note, entities may provide or resell specific hardware or software, services and solutions, or a combination of these:
Expanding on this, for example, the network security category can be further broken down to: